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Abstract: We construct a tax competition model in which local governments finance business 
public services with either a source-based tax on mobile capital, such as a property tax, or a tax on 
production, such as an origin-based Value Added Tax, and then assess which of the two tax 
instruments is more efficient. Many taxes on business apply to mobile inputs or outputs, such as 
property taxes, retail sales taxes, and destination-based VATs, and their inefficiency has been 
examined in the literature; however, proposals from several prominent tax experts to utilize a local 
origin-based VAT have not been analyzed theoretically. Our primary finding is that the production 
tax is less inefficient than the capital tax under many — but not all — conditions. The intuition 
underlying this result is that the efficiency of a user fee on the public business input is roughly 
approximated by a production tax, which applies to both the public input and immobile labor (in 
addition to mobile capital). In marked contrast, the capital tax applies only to mobile capital and 
is thus likely to be relatively inefficient.  
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1.  Introduction 
At the state and local levels in the United States and at the provincial level in Canada, retail sales 
taxes often apply tax to business inputs, even though in principle they should be limited to final 
consumer goods. However, eliminating such taxes on business can provoke strong opposition 
from the electorate. For example, in 2010 British Columbia moved from a retail sales tax that 
was known to tax business inputs due to problems in its administration to a “pure” consumption 
tax — the Harmonized Sales Tax (HST), which combined the provincial retail sales tax and the 
federal Goods and Services Tax into a single value-added tax. This reform was projected to 
decrease tax payments from business by Canadian $730 million (The Independent Panel 2011), 
prompting critics of the HST to decry its shift away from taxing business (CBC News 2011). 
Premier Gordon Campbell introduced the HST shortly after winning office, despite denying any 
intent to do so during his campaign; as a result, the way the provincial government introduced 
the change also sparked strong opposition to the replacement of the provincial sales tax with the 
HST. The opposition was so fierce that continuation of the HST was the subject of a mail-in 
referendum, in which 55% of voters opposed the HST. As a result, British Columbia abandoned 
the HST and had to make the costly transition to re-establishing its provincial retail sales tax.  
 Motivated partly by the political argument that business should pay its “fair share” of 
taxes and partly by the economic argument that efficiency requires that businesses pay for the 
public services they consume (e.g., by paying user charges or being assessed “benefit taxes”), we 
analyze the impacts of imposing a production tax or a capital tax on local business in order to 
finance a public service that serves as an input in firms’ production functions. Because our model 
is characterized by a single consumption good and fixed labor supply, a consumption tax such as 
a destination-based VAT would result in an efficient equilibrium. Nevertheless, we analyze 
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production and capital taxes on business within the context of this model because we are 
interested in the impact of such narrower (capital tax) and broader (production tax) levies on 
business and government, including their effects on the level of public services. These issues are 
especially relevant in light of common political perceptions that firms should pay their “fair 
share” for public services they utilize as well as the economic efficiency argument for requiring 
firms to pay benefit taxes or user charges, and in light of the widespread use of subnational taxes 
on business in practice. 
 Indeed, in addition to taxing retail sales of business inputs, subnational taxes in the 
United States and Canada and in many other countries often include property taxes on business 
capital as well. Both forms of business input taxation may distort a wide variety of decisions, 
including those regarding production, capital accumulation and allocation, and, as stressed in the 
tax competition literature, the level of public services.  
 In light of this situation, several prominent public finance experts have argued that, in the 
absence of the assessment of explicit benefit taxes or user charges on business, broad-based taxes 
on local production, such as an origin-based value added tax (VAT), are an attractive option 
(Bird 2000; Hines 2003). Their primary rationale is that such taxes serve as a proxy for the user 
charges that are desirable on economic efficiency grounds — that is, they are relatively efficient 
“benefit-related” taxes.  
 In this paper, we provide what we believe is the first attempt to analyze systematically the 
assertion that a production-based tax can be viewed as a proxy for a benefit tax, and is thus 
preferable to the often-used alternative of direct or indirect taxes on business inputs, especially 
capital. Our paper provides the theoretical basis underlying the simulation results presented in 
the context of CES production functions in Gugl and Zodrow (2015). 
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 Many papers analyze the efficiency of capital taxation when firms receive public services 
and jurisdictions compete with each other for mobile capital; a partial list includes Zodrow and 
Mieszkowski (henceforth ZM) (1986), Oates and Schwab (1988, 1991), Noiset (1995), Sinn 
(1997), Keen and Marchand (1997), Bayindir-Upmann (1998), Richter (1994), Matsumoto 
(1998, 2000), and Dhillon, Wooders and Zissimos (2007). However, these papers focus on the 
inefficiency of capital taxation alone, and do not consider a tax on local production or compare 
such a production tax to a capital tax.  
 Our results provide some support for the idea that a production-based tax may be viewed 
as a “benefit-related” tax, although only under special circumstances does a production tax 
substitute perfectly for an explicit user charge. The characteristics of the firm’s production 
function — specifically, its log modularity properties (discussed at length below) — play a major 
role in determining the relative efficiency properties of production-based taxes and capital taxes, 
an issue that has thus far not been examined in models of interjurisdictional tax competition.  
 In our analysis, we assume that output is produced with a constant returns to scale (CRS) 
production function using labor, capital, and business public services as inputs. The log 
modularity properties of the production function with respect to capital and business public 
services indicate how the elasticity of output with respect to increases in business public services 
varies at different levels of the amount of capital employed in production. Specifically, if the 
production function is log modular (log submodular, log supermodular) in capital and business 
public services, then the elasticity of output with respect to business public services is constant 
(decreases, increases) as the capital employed in production increases. Note that all three 
possibilities are consistent with a CRS production function; in particular, a linearly homogenous 
Cobb-Douglas production function is log modular, while a constant elasticity of substitution 
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(CES) production function is log submodular (log supermodular) if the elasticity of substitution 
is greater than (less than) one. 
 In the special case of a production function that is log modular in capital and the public 
service, a production tax is effectively a benefit tax, and is thus analogous to a user charge for 
public services that ensures an efficient level of public service provision. In the same vein, if the 
production function is log submodular in capital and public services (e.g., a CES production 
function with an elasticity of substitution greater than one), a production tax is inefficient and 
leads to underprovision of the public service, but it results in less underprovision and thus is less 
inefficient than a capital tax. However, although we can show that the production tax leads to 
overprovision of public services in the case of a log supermodular production function (e.g., a 
CES production function with an elasticity of substitution smaller than 1), the ambiguity of the 
effect of a capital tax on public services in this case implies that a ranking of the relative 
efficiency properties of the two taxes is impossible without further restrictions on the production 
technology. In our companion paper (Gugl and Zodrow 2015), we provide a wide variety of 
simulations using the CES production function and find only modest efficiency gains in the 
instances in which capital taxes are more efficient than the production tax.  
 There is also a vast literature analyzing the relative efficiency of destination-based and 
origin-based value-added taxes (VATs). In a closed economy, there is no difference between a 
uniform tax on all consumption and a similar tax on production. In contrast, as economies 
become increasingly more open, the distinction between a tax on local production and a tax on 
local consumption becomes important in terms of efficiency (Mintz and Tulkens 1986; Kanbur 
and Keen 1993; Lockwood 2001; Haufler and Pflueger 2007). In tax competition models in 
which firms are perfectly competitive, a tax on local consumption such as a destination-based 
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VAT is efficient when countries are too small to affect world prices (Lockwood 2001). Haufler 
and Pflueger (2007) investigate the difference between a destination-based and an origin-based 
VAT in several settings of international duopoly and find that only the former is efficient when 
competition between countries is imperfect. In contrast, McLure (2003) notes that the growing 
importance of electronic commerce implies that a destination-based VAT is increasingly difficult 
to administer, providing an argument in favor of an origin-based VAT.1  
 In practice, most existing value-added taxes and retail sales taxes are destination-based 
taxes. However, there are numerous exceptions to this general rule, that is, cases in which these 
taxes are assessed on an origin basis and are thus similar to the origin-based production tax 
analyzed in this paper (Bird 2003). For example, 11 U.S. states tax intrastate sales on an origin 
basis (a business selling a good or service to a consumer in a different taxing jurisdiction in the 
same state is taxed in the home jurisdiction of the business), while California has a mixed system 
in which state, county, and municipal taxes are assessed on an origin basis but special districts 
use a destination-based approach.2 Similarly, the subnational VATs in Brazil and Argentina and 
the regional business tax in Italy (imposta regionala sulle attività produttive or IRAP) are origin-
based VAT, as is the VAT in Japan (Bird and Gendron 2007; Crawford, Keen and Smith 2010). 
Finally, note that the Hall and Rabushka (2007) flat tax proposal in the United States, as well as 
most of its many progeny which are still attracting the interest of some proponents of tax reform, 
is essentially a “two-part” origin-based VAT.3 
                                                          
1 This problem has been mitigated recently in the United States by the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court 
in South Dakota v. Wayfair Inc., which specifies that remote sellers can under certain circumstances be 
required to collect sales taxes even in states in which they have no physical presence. 
2 The 11 states with origin-based treatment of intrastate sales are Arizona, Illinois, Mississippi, Missouri, 
New Mexico, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, and Virginia (Faggiano 2017).  
3 The Hall-Rabushka flat tax uses the “subtraction” method rather than the almost universally used 
“invoice-credit” VAT method. Under the subtraction method wages are deductible from the tax base at 
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 Despite the vast literature on different forms of VATs, an origin-based VAT has not been 
analyzed in a model of tax competition in which public services are provided to firms. To the 
best of our knowledge, this paper, along with Gugl and Zodrow (2015), is the first to examine 
this issue.  
 In the next two sections, we present the model and discuss our results on the production 
tax. We then contrast these results with the well-known properties of capital taxation in section 
4. Section 5 compares the efficiency properties of a capital tax and a production tax, and Section 
6 concludes. We provide a detailed discussion of log modularity in production in the Appendix.  
 
2.  The Model 
Our model follows the ZM (1986) framework.4,5  A federation or union consists of 𝑁 
jurisdictions, each with the same number of residents who are immobile across jurisdictions. All 
residents have identical preferences and endowments. Individuals work where they live, provide 
a fixed amount of labor, 𝐿, and obtain utility from consumption of an aggregate composite good, 
𝑋. The labor supply of each jurisdiction is therefore fixed.6 People own an equal share of the 
union’s capital stock ?̅?, which is fixed in total supply at 𝑁?̅?. 
 Labor and capital are the private inputs in the production of the consumption good. In 
addition, the local government provides a fully congestible business public service, denoted by 
𝐵𝑖,  that is used directly in the production of the consumption good. Each jurisdiction produces 
with a technology characterized by constant returns to scale (CRS) in the two private inputs and 
                                                          
the business level but taxed, subject to a standard deduction and personal exemptions, at the individual 
level. 
4 Gugl and Zodrow (2015) provide further discussion of the assumptions of the model.  
5 See also Wilson (1986). For reviews of the tax competition literature, see Wilson (1999), Wilson and 
Wildasin (2004), and Zodrow (2003, 2010).  
6 The fixed factor can also be thought of as a combination of labor and land, as assumed by ZM.  
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the public input. We assume throughout the paper that the production function is strictly concave 
in capital and the business public service. The consumption good is assumed to be tradable and is 
taken as the numeraire. We assume that the number of firms is fixed in each jurisdiction (or 
equivalently, given CRS, that there is a single representative firm) and focus therefore on the 
aggregate production function in each jurisdiction, given by 𝐹(𝐵𝑖, 𝐾𝑖, 𝐿). The marginal product 
of each input is positive and strictly decreasing and cross derivatives are positive.7 That is, 
𝐹𝐵, 𝐹𝐾 , 𝐹𝐿 > 0, 𝐹𝐵𝐵, 𝐹𝐾𝐾 , 𝐹𝐿𝐿 < 0, and 𝐹𝐵𝐾, 𝐹𝐵𝐿 , 𝐹𝐾𝐿 > 0. The consumption good can be 
transformed into the public service at a constant marginal rate of transformation of 1, so the unit 
cost of B is also equal to one,8 i.e., for the economy as a whole  
∑ 𝐹(𝐵𝑖, 𝐾𝑖, 𝐿) = ∑ 𝑋𝑖 + 𝐵𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
𝑁
𝑖=1 .                            (1) 
Before we analyze the decisions of the governments of the local jurisdictions, we derive the 
efficient amount of business public services in this economy, denoted by ℬ and state the 
conditions that lead to efficient local production of business public services, ℬ, in each 
jurisdiction.  
 To create a benchmark, we begin by calculating the efficient amount of business public 
services if all inputs can move freely across jurisdictions. Given CRS,  
𝐹(ℬ, 𝑁?̅?, 𝑁𝐿) = 𝑁𝐹(ℬ/𝑁, ?̅?, 𝐿)    (2) 
This function implies that production is independent of where labor is located. Although we 
assume labor is fixed and identically distributed across jurisdictions, for now we neglect this 
                                                          
7 See, e.g., ZM, Bayindir-Upmann (1998), Keen and Marchand (1997), Dhillon et al. (2007) for the same 
assumptions.  
8 We follow most of the literature in assuming constant marginal costs for business public services (Oates 
and Schwab 1988 and 1991; Sinn 1997, Bayindir-Upmann 1998; Keen and Marchand 1997; Richter 
1994; and Matsumoto 2000). Two alternative approaches, which Matsomoto (2000) points out are 
equivalent, would be to assume either an imperfectly congestible public input and a constant marginal 
cost of producing that public input, or a perfectly congestible public input (i.e., our publicly provided 
private service) and decreasing marginal costs of producing the public service.  
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constraint to determine the allocation of labor, capital, and business public services that is 
efficient without jurisdiction-specific constraints. Since the total amounts of capital and labor are 
fixed in the whole economy, and consumers care only about the consumption good, the sole 
choice variable in determining efficiency is how much business public services should be 
produced to maximize consumption, that is, 
max
ℬ
𝐹(ℬ, 𝑁?̅?, 𝑁𝐿) − ℬ.          (3) 
The first order condition is 
𝐹ℬ − 1 = 0,          (4) 
which simply indicates that the efficient aggregate amount of business public services occurs 
where the marginal product of such services equals the marginal rate of transformation of 1. 
Given our assumption of identical jurisdictions and fixed labor, the efficient amount of capital in 
each jurisdiction is equal to 𝐾 and the efficiency condition for public services in each jurisdiction 
is  
𝐹𝐵(𝐵, ?̅?, 𝐿) − 1 = 0     (5) 
In analyzing the impact of financing business public services either with a capital tax or a tax on 
production, we compare the marginal productivity of business public services in a jurisdiction 
under either of the two taxes with the efficient marginal productivity of one. If the marginal 
productivity of business public services is smaller (larger) than one, there is over (under) 
provision as, in equilibrium, the amount of public services that each jurisdiction provides is 
larger (smaller) than the efficient amount. Next, we turn to the financing of business public 
services with a production tax.  
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3.  Production Tax 
Suppose that local jurisdictions tax local production to finance the provision of public services to 
firms. The amount of capital a local jurisdiction might attract depends on the level of business 
public services and the production tax rate 𝑡𝑖; hence, K is a function of the policy mix 𝐵𝑖, 𝑡𝑖. We 
derive below the perceived change in capital in a jurisdiction as it increases its production tax to 
finance an increase in its level of business public services. For now, we simply note that capital 
is perceived to change with changes in the policy mix, i.e., 𝐾𝑖(𝐵𝑖, 𝑡𝑖).  
 The local government’s budget constraint is given by 
𝐵𝑖 = 𝑡𝑖𝐹(𝐵𝑖, 𝐾𝑖(𝐵𝑖, 𝑡𝑖), 𝐿) + 𝐻,    (6) 
where H is a fixed amount of public services that is financed externally. We will focus on the 
jurisdiction’s problem when 𝐻 = 0, but it is useful to consider the case of 𝐻 > 0 when 
interpreting the Lagrange multiplier 𝜆 below.  
 Firms maximize profits, given factor prices, the tax on production, and the level of local 
business public services provided. They demand both labor and capital, but since labor is fixed in 
each jurisdiction, the local labor market will clear at L. Since capital is perfectly mobile across 
jurisdictions, the after-tax rate of return to capital, r, is the same in every jurisdiction. The 
jurisdiction takes as given the firm’s profit maximization condition 
(1 − 𝑡)𝐹𝐾(𝐵𝑖, 𝐾𝑖(𝐵𝑖, 𝑡𝑖), 𝐿) = 𝑟.    (7) 
We assume the local government acts to maximize the welfare of its representative resident, who 
owns all of the fixed labor input, and that any profits earned from production due to the provision 
of business public services will accrue to that resident as well. Thus, the profits in any given 
jurisdiction enter the local government’s social welfare function together with locally earned 
wages and the capital income earned by its resident. To simplify the notation below, we suppress 
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the subscript i in analyzing a single local government’s optimization problem, which is to choose 
the production tax rate and the level of business public services to 
max
𝐵,𝑡
[(1 − 𝑡)𝐹(𝐵, 𝐾(𝐵, 𝑡), 𝐿) − 𝑟𝐾(𝐵, 𝑡)] + 𝑟?̅?,                           (8) 
subject to equations (6) and (7). 
 The term in square brackets of (8) is the sum of wage income and profits generated in the 
jurisdiction. The Lagrange function for the government’s optimization problem is 
max
𝐵,𝑡
[(1 − 𝑡)𝐹(𝐵, 𝐾(𝐵, 𝑡), 𝐿) − 𝑟𝐾(𝐵, 𝑡)] + 𝑟?̅? + 𝜆[𝐻 + 𝑡𝐹(𝐵, 𝐾(𝐵, 𝑡), 𝐿) − 𝐵].     (9) 
The first order conditions with respect to 𝐵, 𝑡 taking (7) into account are  
(1 − 𝑡)𝐹𝐵 + 𝜆 (𝑡𝐹𝐵 + 𝑡𝐹𝐾
𝜕𝐾
𝜕𝐵
− 1) = 0     (10) 
−𝐹 + 𝜆 (𝐹 + 𝑡𝐹𝐾
𝜕𝐾
𝜕𝑡
) = 0.       (11) 
Note that at the optimal production tax and level of business public services, an increase in H and 
hence less reliance on self-financing of business public services leads to an increase in residents’ 
income/consumption equal to 𝜆. 
 Consider first the hypothetical case in which capital is fixed in a jurisdiction, i.e., 𝜕𝐾/𝜕𝐵 
and 𝜕𝐾/𝜕𝑡 are zero. In this case, the first order conditions imply that the local jurisdiction 
provides business public services such that 𝐹𝐵 = 1 and that 𝜆 = 1. By the Envelope Theorem, 
the Lagrange multiplier measures how much residents’ income would increase if local 
jurisdictions faced a “soft” budget constraint and were given one unit of public services for free. 
Given that the Lagrange multiplier is 1 when local jurisdictions do not perceive a change in the 
capital in their jurisdiction, residents’ income would go up by 1, which is equal to the marginal 
rate of transformation between the consumption good and business public services; as local 
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governments receive a unit of the business public service for free, they save the marginal cost of 
business public services.  
 By comparison, if capital reacts to changes in the level of business public services and the 
production tax, then 𝜕𝐾/𝜕𝐵 and 𝜕𝐾/𝜕𝑡 are derived as follows. Differentiating (7) with respect to 
the production tax and capital and solving for 𝜕𝐾/𝜕𝐵 yields 
𝜕𝐾
𝜕𝐵
=
−𝐹𝐾𝐵
𝐹𝐾𝐾
> 0.                                (12) 
Differentiating (7) with respect to business public services and capital and solving for 𝑑𝐾/𝑑𝑡 
yields 
𝜕𝐾
𝜕𝑡
=
𝐹𝐾
(1−𝑡)𝐹𝐾𝐾
< 0.                              (13) 
Thus, from the local government’s perspective, an increase in the production tax without an 
increase in public services would drive out capital, and an increase in public services without an 
increase in the production tax would attract capital to the jurisdiction. These two perceived 
distortions created by mobile capital need to be considered in setting the optimal production tax 
rate and the associated level of business public services. Note that the two distortions are 
characterized as perceived in the sense that, in equilibrium, each jurisdiction follows the same 
policies and thus adopts the same production tax rate, so that each jurisdiction receives an equal 
share of the total (mobile) national capital stock.  
 If we were to impose a consumption tax, c, instead of the production tax, this would be 
equivalent to imposing an income tax on residents on all sources of income. Thus would yield a 
budget balance condition of 
𝐵 = 𝑐[𝐹(𝐵, 𝐾, 𝐿) − 𝑟𝐾 + 𝑟?̅?] + 𝐻, 
and a profit maximization constraint 
𝐹𝐾 = 𝑟. 
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With these changes to our model, a consumption tax, ie., a destination-based VAT, would lead to 
efficiency as all sources of distortion would be removed. However, as discussed in our 
introduction, we focus on taxes that are levied on business to examine the extent to which they 
can be viewed as benefit-related taxes.  
 Returning to our analysis of a production tax, substituting from (12) and (13) into the first 
order conditions (10-11) yields the optimal tax rate 
𝑡 =
(1−𝐹𝐵)𝐹𝐾𝐾𝐹
𝐹𝐾(𝐹𝐵𝐹𝐾−𝐹𝐹𝐾𝐵)
.                        (14) 
Note that by Young’s Theorem, 𝐹𝐾𝐵 = 𝐹𝐵𝐾. The elasticity of the marginal productivity of capital 
with respect to an increase in capital is 𝜀𝐹𝐾,𝐾 = −𝐹𝐾𝐾𝐾/𝐹𝐾, the elasticity of the marginal 
productivity of public services with respect to an increase in capital is 𝜀𝐹𝐵,𝐾 = 𝐹𝐵𝐾𝐾/𝐹𝐵, and the 
output elasticity of capital is 𝜀𝐾 = 𝐹𝐾𝐾/𝐹. Using these elasticities, (14) becomes 
𝑡 =
(1−𝐹𝐵)𝜀𝐹𝐾,𝐾
𝐹𝐵(𝜀𝐹𝐵,𝐾−𝜀𝐾)
.                     (15) 
Whether the production tax rate leads to overprovision or underprovision of business public 
services therefore depends on the difference between 𝜀𝐹𝐵,𝐾 and 𝜀𝐾. The numerator of (15) is 
positive if there is overprovision of public services, i.e., if 𝐹𝐵 < 1, and an interior solution for the 
production tax rate must thus be characterized by a positive difference between 𝜀𝐹𝐵,𝐾 and 𝜀𝐾. We 
summarize our finding below.  
Proposition 1: With a positive production tax rate, overprovision of business public services 
occurs if at 𝐹𝐵 < 1, 𝜀𝐹𝐵,𝐾 > 𝜀𝐾. Underprovision occurs if at 𝐹𝐵 > 1, 𝜀𝐹𝐵,𝐾 < 𝜀𝐾. 
In the case in which production functions are log submodular or log supermodular, 𝜀𝐹𝐵,𝐾 and 𝜀𝐾 
exhibit the same relationship to each other, regardless of the amounts of B, K, and L.  
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Lemma 1: A production function is log sub (super) modular if and only if 𝜀𝐹𝐵,𝐾 <
𝜀𝐾 (𝜀𝐹𝐵,𝐾 > 𝜀𝐾).  
The proof of Lemma 1 is provided in the appendix, which includes a detailed discussion of log 
sub (super) modularity.  
 In the simulations performed in Gugl and Zodrow (2015), we use the CES production 
function with an elasticity of substitution less than 1 as an example of a log supermodular 
production function and the CES production function with an elasticity of substitution greater 
than 1 as an example of a log submodular production function. We provide more examples of log 
sub (super) modular production functions in the Appendix. 
 Our next result follows immediately from Lemma 1 and Proposition 1. 
Corollary 1: A production tax is inefficient whenever the production function is log submodular 
or log supermodular in capital and business public services. Log submodularity 
(supermodularity) leads to underprovision (overprovision) of business public services. 
Note that (15) cannot be used to assess the interior solution if the difference between 𝜀𝐹𝐵,𝐾 and 
𝜀𝐾 is zero. Instead, we take a different approach to assess this case and ask what would happen 
when a budget-balanced increase in the tax rate and public services is considered, in which case 
both budget balance and the firm’s profit maximization condition, that is, equations (6) and (7), 
must hold. Totally differentiating both equations with respect to the production tax, capital, and 
the public service, yields 
𝑑𝐾
𝑑𝑡
=
(1−𝑡𝐹𝐵)𝐹𝐾−(1−𝑡)𝐹𝐾𝐵𝐹
(1−𝑡)(𝐹𝐾𝐵𝑡𝐹𝐾+(1−𝑡𝐹𝐵)𝐹𝐾𝐾)
 .    (16) 
Suppose jurisdictions choose the efficient amount of business public services, i.e. 𝐹𝐵 = 1. In this 
case (16) becomes 
𝑑𝐾
𝑑𝑡
=
𝐹𝐾−𝐹𝐾𝐵𝐹
(𝐹𝐾𝐵𝑡𝐹𝐾+(1−𝑡)𝐹𝐾𝐾)
.                          (17) 
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Governments will set the level of business public services efficiently only if they are assured that 
no capital flows in or out of their jurisdiction at the tax rate that leads to 𝐹𝐵 = 1. Put differently, 
𝑑𝐾/𝑑𝑡 = 0, if at 𝐹𝐵 = 1 the numerator of (17) is zero and hence 𝐹𝐵𝐹𝐾 = 𝐹𝐾𝐵𝐹 at 𝐹𝐵 = 1. In 
terms of elasticities, we need the difference between 𝜀𝐹𝐵,𝐾 and 𝜀𝐾 to be zero at 𝐹𝐵 = 1. 
We summarize our result in the next proposition. 
Proposition 2: With a positive production tax rate, efficient provision of business public services 
occurs if at 𝐹𝐵 = 1, 𝜀𝐹𝐵,𝐾 = 𝜀𝐾. 
Lemma 2: The equality 𝜀𝐹𝐵,𝐾 = 𝜀𝐾 is always satisfied when the production function is log 
modular in B and K.  
The proof is in the Appendix, where we provide examples of log modular production functions. 
As noted previously, a prominent example of the log modular case is the Cobb-Douglas function.  
Corollary 2: If a production function is log modular, a production tax is efficient. 
The intuition underlying these results is as follows. The government of the jurisdiction 
considering an increase in the production tax balances two factors. First, an increase in the tax 
will reduce profits, and thus tends to drive capital out of the jurisdiction. Second, the increase in 
business public services financed with the tax will increase the productivity of capital 
(generating more output at any given level of capital), and thus attract capital to the jurisdiction, 
which will in turn increase the productivity of local business public services. The case of log 
modularity corresponds to a production function for which these two effects are exactly 
offsetting. In this case, the increase in the capital stock attracted by the increase in public 
services generates an “average” increase in the productivity of public services, that is, one equal 
to the increase in output due to the same increase in capital.  
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 By comparison, in the case of a log supermodular production function, the production tax 
increase has an additional benefit: the production function is such that, as the capital stock 
increases in response to the provision of additional public services, the productivity of public 
services increases more than proportionately. This additional benefit implies that the total 
marginal benefit to capital of the additional production-tax-financed public services outweighs 
the cost of paying the additional tax, and the production tax attracts capital to the jurisdiction. 
This ability to attract capital is sufficient to cause the government of the jurisdiction to 
overprovide business public services in order to attract additional capital (it does not take into 
account the cost to other jurisdictions that are losing capital as a result of their policy).  
 These results are reversed in the case of a log submodular production function, as the 
productivity of public services increases less than proportionately (relative to the increase in 
output) as additional capital is attracted to the jurisdiction with production-tax-financed public 
services, in which case the tax effect outweighs the productivity effect, and capital is driven out 
of the jurisdiction. As noted above, these two distortions attributable to the mobility of capital 
are only perceived distortions in the sense that, in equilibrium, each jurisdiction follows the same 
policies and thus adopts the same production tax rate, so that each jurisdiction receives an equal 
share of the total (mobile) national capital stock.  
4.  Capital Tax 
Many authors have analyzed capital taxes using the original ZM framework.9 Our analysis of 
capital taxation follows the approach used above to analyze the production tax in order to 
facilitate comparisons of the effects of the capital tax to those of the production tax.  
                                                          
9 For a detailed literature review, see Gugl and Zodrow (2015).  
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Suppose that local governments impose a tax on capital at rate 𝜏 to finance business public 
services. The firm’s condition for profit maximization under the capital tax is 
𝐹𝐾(𝐵, 𝐾(𝐵, 𝜏), 𝐿) = 𝑟 + 𝜏.                                                 (18) 
Analogous to the production tax case, the jurisdiction solves the problem 
max
𝐵,𝜏
[𝐹(𝐵, 𝐾(𝐵, 𝜏), 𝐿) − (𝑟 + 𝜏)𝐾] + 𝑟?̅? + 𝜇[𝐻 + 𝜏𝐾 − 𝐵],          (19) 
subject to (18),where the first term in square brackets is the sum of wage income and profits 
generated in the jurisdiction and the second term in square brackets reflects the jurisdiction’s 
budget constraint. The first order conditions for the government’s optimization problem are 
𝐹𝐵 + 𝜇 (𝜏
𝜕𝐾
𝜕𝐵
− 1) = 0                                    (20) 
−𝐾 + 𝜇 (𝐾 + 𝜏
𝜕𝐾
𝜕𝜏
) = 0.                                    (21) 
As in the previous section, if the capital stock is unchanged in the jurisdiction, 𝐹𝐵 = 𝜇 = 1. 
The jurisdiction takes the firm’s profit maximization condition as given when deriving its 
perceived change in capital due to changes in the capital tax rate and the level of business public 
services. Differentiating (19) with respect to the capital tax and capital and solving for 
𝜕𝐾/𝜕𝜏 yields 
𝜕𝐾
𝜕𝜏
=
1
𝐹𝐾𝐾
< 0.                                 (22) 
The reaction of capital to an increase in the level of public services is the same under both taxes 
and is given by (12). 
From (12), (20), (21) and (22) we find the optimal capital tax 
𝜏 =
−𝐹𝐾𝐾𝐾(1−𝐹𝐵)
𝐹𝐾𝐵𝐾−𝐹𝐵
.                             (23) 
Expressing the optimal capital tax (23) in terms of the elasticity of the marginal productivity of 
business public services with respect to an increase in capital,  
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𝜏 =
𝐹𝐾(1−𝐹𝐵)𝜀𝐹𝐾,𝐾
𝐹𝐵(𝜀𝐹𝐵,𝐾−1)
,           (24) 
which implies our next result. 
Proposition 3: With a positive capital tax, underprovision of business public services occurs if at 
𝐹𝐵 > 1, 𝜀𝐹𝐵 ,𝐾 < 1. Overprovision of business public services occurs if at 𝐹𝐵 < 1, 𝜀𝐹𝐵,𝐾 > 1. 
Proposition 3 states that if we deal with production functions that exhibit 𝜀𝐹𝐵,𝐾 < 1 for any B and 
K, we will always have underprovision of public services under a capital tax.10  
 Note that (24) cannot be used to assess the interior solution if 𝜀𝐹𝐵,𝐾 = 1. In order to 
examine this case, consider again the perceived outflow of capital after taking into account 
budget balance, following the approach we utilized for the production tax in section 3, or  
𝑑𝐾
𝑑𝜏
=
1−𝐹𝐾𝐵𝐾
𝐹𝐾𝐾+𝜏𝐹𝐾𝐵
=
𝐹𝐵(1−𝜀𝐹𝐵,𝐾)
𝐹𝐾𝐾+𝜏𝐹𝐾𝐵
.    (25) 
Local jurisdictions do not perceive an outflow of capital if 𝜀𝐹𝐵,𝐾 = 1.  This implies 
Proposition 4: With a positive capital tax, efficient provision of business public services occurs if 
and only if at 𝐹𝐵 = 1, 𝜀𝐹𝐵,𝐾 = 1. 
Propositions 3 and 4 relate to the existing literature on the efficient provision of business public 
services with a capital tax. Matsumoto (1998, p. 471) notes: “If the number of firms is constant 
in each jurisdiction (normalized to one), […] [𝐹𝐵] may be below one because the sign of 
[𝐹𝐾𝐵𝐾 − 𝐹𝐵] is indeterminate under linear homogeneity with respect to all inputs. This argument 
corresponds to the Noiset (1995) result of potential overprovision in the [ZM] model where the 
variability of the number of firms is not explicitly considered.” Dhillon et al. (2007) construct a 
model with two production inputs (capital and public services only) and then show that 
                                                          
10 Such is the case for a Cobb-Douglas production function and any CES production function 
with substitution elasticity greater than 1; see, e.g., Gugl and Zodrow (2015).  
    
 
 
19 
overprovision, efficient provision, or underprovision of business public services can occur 
depending on whether the production function is only locally or globally strictly concave in 
capital and the public service. In Gugl and Zodrow (2015), we use a CES production function 
with a substitution elasticity less than one to provide numerical examples in which the capital tax 
is efficient.  
 
5.  Efficiency Properties of the Production and Capital Taxes 
The various equilibrium outcomes under the production tax and capital tax regimes can be 
summarized as follows: 
Table 1: Comparison of Production Tax and Capital Tax Equilibria 
 efficient provision 𝑭𝑩 = 𝟏 underprovision 𝑭𝑩 > 𝟏 overprovision 𝑭𝑩 < 𝟏 
production tax 𝜀𝐹𝐵,𝐾 = 𝜀𝐾 𝜀𝐹𝐵,𝐾 < 𝜀𝐾 𝜀𝐹𝐵,𝐾 > 𝜀𝐾 
capital tax 𝜀𝐹𝐵,𝐾 = 1 𝜀𝐹𝐵,𝐾 < 1 𝜀𝐹𝐵,𝐾 > 1 
 
We turn next to an evaluation of the relative efficiency properties of the two taxes. 
 
 Corollaries 1 and 2 identify the properties of the production function that guarantee 
efficient provision, overprovision, or underprovision under the production tax. We first consider 
production functions for which log modularity (with 𝜀𝐹𝐵,𝐾 = 𝜀𝐾) or log submodularity (with 
𝜀𝐹𝐵,𝐾 < 𝜀𝐾) holds and investigate the relative efficiency properties of the production tax and the 
capital tax under the same technologies. In order to do this, it is important to note how these 
properties relate to the question of whether 𝜀𝐹𝐵,𝐾 < 1.  
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Proposition 5: If 𝐹(𝐵, 𝐾, 𝐿) is log submodular or log modular and strictly concave in (𝐵, 𝐾), 
then 𝜀𝐹𝐵,𝐾 < 1.  
Proof: For a strictly concave function in 𝐾, 𝐹𝐾𝐾 < 𝐹 and hence 𝜀𝐾 < 1. By Lemmas 1 and 2, a 
log (sub) modular production function in (𝐵, 𝐾) exhibits 𝜀𝐹𝐵,𝐾 ≤ 𝜀𝐾. Together these two 
properties imply the stated result.  
Note, however, that even if 𝜀𝐾 < 1 holds, there is no restriction on the log modularity property of 
𝐹(𝐵, 𝐾, 𝐿) in (𝐵, 𝐾). 
 Proposition 5 in turn implies 
Proposition 6: If 𝐹(𝐵, 𝐾, 𝐿) is log modular, then the production tax leads to efficient provision 
while the capital tax leads to underprovision of business public services; hence the production 
tax is more efficient than the capital tax.  
 By comparison, in the case of log submodular production functions, underprovision 
occurs under both tax regimes. Nevertheless, it is possible to rank the efficiency properties of the 
two taxes, as shown in 
Proposition 7: Suppose that the production function is log submodular in (𝐵, 𝐾) and that interior 
solutions to both the optimal capital tax and the optimal production tax problems exist. Under 
these conditions, the production tax is unambiguously more efficient than the capital tax.  
Proof: We first provide an outline of the proof. Suppose that under the capital tax each 
jurisdiction chooses the tax rate optimally and the economy is in equilibrium so that 𝐵𝜏 = 𝜏?̅?. 
Total output is the same in all jurisdictions (given symmetry and a fixed national aggregate 
capital stock) and thus all derivatives of the production function with respect to B and K are also 
identical across jurisdictions. Using the optimality condition for the capital tax (24) we can 
calculate the production tax equivalent that would result at the same level of business public 
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services as under the optimal capital tax equilibrium if all jurisdictions assumed that capital 
reacts to their provision of public services and to a tax increase exactly as under the equilibrium 
capital tax. We then show that the optimality condition for the production tax (15) does not hold 
simultaneously at this production tax rate. In particular, the level of the production tax given the 
calculated elasticities at 𝐵𝜏 and 𝐾 is higher, which implies a larger B; this in turn implies that, for 
a given increase in business public services B, the jurisdiction perceives a smaller capital outflow 
under a production tax than under the capital tax, which implies a higher level of B under the 
optimal production tax than under the optimal capital tax. Since both tax regimes lead to 
underprovision, the production tax must thus result in less underprovision than the capital tax.  
 More formally, the production tax equivalent of the capital tax rate under the optimal 
capital tax equilibrium is given by  
𝑡𝜏 =
𝐵𝜏
𝐹(𝐵𝜏,?̅?,𝐿)
=
𝐹𝐾
𝜏 (1−𝐹𝐵
𝜏 )𝜀𝐹𝐾,𝐾
𝜏 ?̅?
𝐹𝐵
𝜏 (𝜀𝐹𝐵,𝐾
𝜏 −1)𝐹𝜏
 .                (26) 
The optimal production tax, however, at the elasticities evaluated at 𝐵𝜏 and 𝐾 is 
𝑡(𝐵𝜏, 𝐾) =
(1−𝐹𝐵
𝜏 )𝜀𝐹𝐾,𝐾
𝜏
𝐹𝐵
𝜏 (𝜀𝐹𝐵,𝐾
𝜏 −𝜀𝐾
𝜏 )
.               (27) 
Thus, if 𝑡𝜏 < 𝑡(𝐵𝜏, 𝐾), then the capital tax results in more underprovision of business public 
services than the production tax and hence is less efficient. Note that  
𝐹𝐾
𝜏 (1−𝐹𝐵
𝜏 )𝜀𝐹𝐾,𝐾
𝜏 ?̅?
𝐹𝐵
𝜏 (𝜀𝐹𝐵,𝐾
𝜏 −1)𝐹𝜏
<
(1−𝐹𝐵
𝜏 )𝜀𝐹𝐾,𝐾
𝜏
𝐹𝐵
𝜏 (𝜀𝐹𝐵,𝐾
𝜏 −𝜀𝐾
𝜏 )
             (28) 
if and only if 
−
1
𝜀𝐾
𝜏 (𝜀𝐹𝐵,𝐾
𝜏 − 1) > −(𝜀𝐹𝐵,𝐾
𝜏 − 𝜀𝐾
𝜏 ),            (29) 
which is unambiguously true, as both sides are positive and strict concavity of the production 
function in K implies that the left hand side is greater than the right hand side. 
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 Our results in the cases of log modular and log submodular production functions validate 
the conjecture that a broad-based tax on local production is more efficient than a tax on capital. 
However, there is no analog to Proposition 7 in the case of log supermodular production 
functions, as either the production tax or the capital tax can be the more efficient business tax 
option. Moreover, there are prominent examples of such functions. As noted previously, the 
family of CES production functions includes examples of all three log modularity properties — 
log submodularity, log modularity, and log supermodularity — depending on whether the 
elasticity of substitution between capital and public services/labor is greater than, equal to, or 
less than one. In Gugl and Zodrow (2015), we examine more closely CES production functions 
characterized by log supermodularity in the context of tax competition in the provision of 
business public services. We show that both the production tax and the capital tax can be the 
more efficient tax option, but in the latter case, the efficiency gain from utilizing the capital tax 
instead of the production tax is relatively small. By comparison, relatively large efficiency gains 
can sometimes be obtained by using the production tax rather than the capital tax in those cases 
in which the production tax is the more efficient tax option.  
 
6.  Conclusion 
Can a production tax, such as an origin-based value-added tax, approximate a benefit tax for 
public services provided to businesses, as suggested by Bird (2000) and Hines (2003)? How does 
a source-based capital tax such as the property tax compare to a production tax as a proxy for a 
benefit tax? Using the ZM model of interjurisdictional tax competition, we find that a production 
tax more closely approximates a benefit tax than does a capital tax in many instances. In 
particular, although a production tax is efficient only when the production function is log 
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modular in business public services and capital, it is always less inefficient than a capital tax in 
the case of log submodular production technologies.  
 The basic intuition underlying the result that the production tax is often more efficient 
than the capital tax is that the capital tax applies to a narrower and relatively mobile tax base, 
while the production tax applies to a broader base that includes both relatively immobile labor 
and local business public services. However, if there is very strong complementarity between 
capital and business public services (as assumed by Sinn 1997 and Oates and Schwab 1988, 
1991), then the capital tax is more likely to approximate a benefit tax than when capital and 
business public services are more substitutable. By comparison, in the presence of significant 
substitution opportunities between capital and business public services, a broader tax base that 
includes both immobile labor and the contribution of public services to output mimics more 
closely efficient user charges on public services.11 
 Our results have some interesting implications for potential reforms of state/provincial 
tax systems, as they suggest that a production tax may be a viable business tax alternative to the 
state/provincial retail sales tax, which is typically characterized by significant taxation of 
business inputs similar to that which occurs under a capital tax. By comparison, at least under 
certain circumstances in our admittedly highly stylized model, a production tax is less 
distortionary than the capital tax portion of a retail sales tax.  
 
  
                                                          
11 In an earlier version of this paper (Gugl and Zodrow, CESifo Working Paper No. 5555, available at 
https://www.cesifo-group.de/DocDL/cesifo1_wp5555.pdf), we also compared the production tax to a 
uniform tax on only private inputs, under the assumption of Cobb-Douglas production functions. The 
latter tax is efficient in Matsumoto and Sugahara (2017) where the production function is CRS in private 
inputs only, but we show that it is inefficient in the case of many Cobb-Douglas production functions if 
the function is CRS in all inputs including public services even though such technology implies that the 
production tax is efficient. 
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Appendix: Log (Sub/Super) Modularity 
Before discussing log (sub/super) modularity, we first review (sub/super) modularity and then 
point out the differences between these two related concepts.  
 
A.1 Definition and Examples 
To define (sub/super) modularity of B and K, consider any two input vectors with the same 
amount of labor but different amounts of B and K, with one input vector containing strictly less 
of both (𝐵, 𝐾, 𝐿) than the other (𝐵, 𝐾, 𝐿). Since we keep labor the same in all our analysis, L is 
suppressed in our analysis. By definition, modularity holds if and only if 
𝐹(𝐵, 𝐾) + 𝐹(𝐵, 𝐾) = 𝐹(𝐵, 𝐾) + 𝐹(𝐵, 𝐾) .                                 (A1) 
Under modularity, a given increase in one input results in the same increase of output regardless 
of how much output is being produced. Another way of thinking about the implications of 
modularity is by choosing the input combinations on the RHS of equation (A1) such that  
𝐹(𝐵, 𝐾) = 𝐹(𝐵, 𝐾) = 𝑌0 .                               (A2) 
With modularity, the arithmetic mean of 𝐹(𝐵, 𝐾) and 𝐹(𝐵, 𝐾) must equal 𝑌0. For super (sub) 
modularity, the arithmetic mean of 𝐹(𝐵, 𝐾) and 𝐹(𝐵, 𝐾) must be greater (less) than 𝑌0. For 
example, in the case of submodularity, total output of 𝑌0 can be produced with the arithmetic 
mean of 𝐹(𝐵, 𝐾) and some other output level generated with larger amounts of both inputs, but 
the output level 𝐹(𝐵, 𝐾) is not large enough to achieve this; instead, inputs larger than (𝐵, 𝐾) are 
necessary to achieve an arithmetic mean of 𝑌0. 
 An example of a production function that is modular in B and K is one for which the 
functions involving inputs B and K enter additively, i.e.,  
    
 
 
28 
𝐹(𝐵, 𝐾, 𝐿) = 𝑔(𝐵)ℎ(𝐿) + 𝑖(𝐾)𝑗(𝐿) + 𝑚(𝐵) + 𝑜(𝐾) + 𝑝(𝐿), 
where all the individual functions are increasing in their inputs. By comparison, a function of the 
form 
𝐹(𝐵, 𝐾, 𝐿) = 𝑔(𝐵)ℎ(𝐿)𝑖(𝐾)𝑗(𝐿) + 𝑚(𝐵) + 𝑜(𝐾) + 𝑝(𝐿) 
is supermodular. 
 Log modularity, in contrast, compares  relative marginal products rather than the absolute 
marginal products of inputs. That is, log modularity in B and K holds if and only if  
𝐹(𝐵, 𝐾)𝐹(𝐵, 𝐾) = 𝐹(𝐵, 𝐾)𝐹(𝐵, 𝐾) .             (A3) 
As in the discussion of (sub/super) modularity, another way to think about the implications of log 
modularity is by choosing the input combinations on the RHS of equation (A3) so that (A2) 
holds. For log modularity, the geometric mean of 𝐹(𝐵, 𝐾) and 𝐹(𝐵, 𝐾) must equal 𝑌0. For log 
super (sub) modularity, the geometric mean of 𝐹(𝐵, 𝐾) and 𝐹(𝐵, 𝐾) must be greater (smaller) 
than 𝑌0. For example, in the case of log submodularity, total output of  𝑌0 can be produced with 
the geometric mean of 𝐹(𝐵, 𝐾) and some other output level generated with higher amounts of 
both inputs, but the output level 𝐹(𝐵, 𝐾) is not large enough to achieve this; instead, inputs 
larger than (𝐵, 𝐾) are necessary to achieve a geometric mean of 𝑌0. 
 An example of a production function that is log modular in B and K is one for which the 
inputs enter multiplicatively, e.g.,  
𝐹(𝐵, 𝐾, 𝐿) = 𝑔(𝐵)ℎ(𝐾)𝑖(𝐿), 
where all the individual functions are increasing in their inputs. Note that such functions are 
simultaneously supermodular in B and K. An example of a log supermodular function is  
𝐹(𝐵, 𝐾, 𝐿) = 𝑔(𝐵)ℎ(𝐾)𝑖(𝐿) + 𝑗(𝐿), 
which is simultaneously super modular in B and K.  
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 An example of a log submodular function is 
𝐹(𝐵, 𝐾, 𝐿) = 𝑔(𝐵) + ℎ(𝐾) + 𝑖(𝐿), 
which is simultaneously modular in B and K. However, log submodular functions can also be 
simultaneously supermodular; an example is  
𝐹(𝐵, 𝐾, 𝐿) = [𝑔(𝐵) + ℎ(𝐾) + 𝑖(𝐿)]𝛼, 
where 𝛼 > 0. 
A.2 Proof of Lemma 1: Expressing Log (Sub/Super) Modularity in terms of elasticities 
Note that log modularity can be expressed as  
𝐹(𝐵,𝐾)
𝐹(𝐵,𝐾)
=
𝐹(𝐵,𝐾)
𝐹(𝐵,𝐾)
 .                (A4) 
Hence a log modular production function must exhibit the same percentage change in output due 
to a given increase in K, regardless of the level of B, or 
𝜕𝜀𝐾
𝜕𝐵
= 0,              (A5) 
where 𝜀𝐾 = 𝐹𝐾𝐾/𝐹, which holds if and only if 
𝐾
𝐹𝐾𝐵𝐹−𝐹𝐵𝐹𝐾
𝐹2
= 0.            (A6) 
Since by Young’s Theorem 𝐹𝐾𝐵 = 𝐹𝐵𝐾, and 𝜀𝐹𝐵,𝐾 = 𝐹𝐵𝐾𝐾/𝐹𝐵, (A6) can be expressed as 
𝜀𝐹𝐵,𝐾 = 𝜀𝐾.            (A7) 
Similarly, log submodularity requires 𝜀𝐹𝐵,𝐾 < 𝜀𝐾 and log supermodularity requires 𝜀𝐹𝐵,𝐾 > 𝜀𝐾. 
Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation 
Working Paper series recent papers 
 
WP19/01 Michael P Devereux, Alan Auerbach, Michael Keen, Paul Oosterhuis, Wolfgang 
Schön and John Vella Residual profit allocation by income 
 
WP18/22 Ronny Freier, Martin Simmler and Christian Wittrock Public good provision, 
commuting and local employment 
 
WP18/21 Christian Wittrock Localization Economies and the Sensitivity of Firm Foundations 
to Changes in Taxation and Public Expenditures 
 
WP18/20 Nadine Riedel, Martin Simmler and Christian Wittrock Local fiscal policies and 
their impact on the number and spatial distribution of new firms 
 
WP18/19 Leonie Hug and Martin Simmler How cost-effective is public R&D in stimulating 
firm innovation? 
 
WP18/18 Wiji Arulampalam and Andrea Papini  Tax Progressivity and Self-Employment 
Dynamics 
 
WP18/17 Wiji Arulampalam, Michael P Devereux and Federica Liberini Taxes and the 
Location of Targets 
 
WP18/16 Frank M Fossen, Ray Rees, Davud Rostam-Afschaf and Viktor Steiner How do 
Entrepreneurial Portfolios Respond to Income Taxation 
 
WP18/15 Sebastian Beer, Ruud de Mooij and Li Liu  International Corporate Tax Avoidance: 
A Review of the Channels, Magnitudes and Blind Spots 
 
WP18/14 Daisy Ogembo Are Presumptive Taxes a Good Option for Taxing Self-Employed 
Professionals in Developing Countries  
 
WP18/13  Ilan Benshalom The Rise of Inequality and the fall of Tax Equity 
 
WP18/12 Thomas Torslov, Ludwig Weir and Gabriel Zucman  The Missing Profits of Nations 
 
WP18/11 Andrea Lassman and Benedikt Zoller-Rydzek  Decomposing the Margins of 
Transfer Pricing 
 
WP18/10 Travis Chow, Jeffrey L Hoopes and Edward L Maydew US Firms on Foreign (tax) 
Holidays 
 
WP18/09 Claudio Agostini, Juan Pablo Atal and Andrea Repetto Firms Response to Tax 
Enforcement through Audits 
 
WP18/08 Mazhar Waseem Information, Asymmetric Incentives or Withholding? 
Understanding the Self-Enforcement of Value-Added-Tax 
 
WP18/07 Matthew Smith, Danny Yagan, Owen Zidar and Eric Zwick Capitalists in the 
twenty-first century 
 
WP18/06 Daniel Shaviro The new non-territorial U.S international tax system 
 
WP18/05 Eric M Zolt Tax Treaties and Developing Countries  
 
WP18/04 Anne Brockmeyer, Marco Hernandez, Stewart Kettle and Spencer Smith Casting a 
wider tax net: Experimental evidence from Costa Rica 
 
WP18/03 Ruud de Mooij and Li Liu At a cost:the real effects of transfer pricing regulations 
 
WP18/02 Rita de la Feria Tax fraud and the rule of law 
 
WP18/01 Eddy Hiu Fung Tam Behavioural response to time notches in transaction tax: 
Evidence from stamp duty in Hong Kong and Singapore 
 
WP17/19 Michael P. Devereux, Giorgia Maffini and Jing Xing Corporate tax incentives & 
capital structure: New evidence from UK firm-level tax returns 
 
WP17/18 Sarah Clifford Taxing Multinationals beyond borders: financial and locational 
responses to CFC rules 
 
WP17/17 Dominik von Hagen and Axel Prettl Controlled foreign corporation rules and cross-
border M&A activity 
 
WP17/16 Marie Lamensch Destination based taxation of corporate profits - preliminary 
findings regarding tax collection in cross-border situations 
 
WP17/15 Li Liu Tim Schmidt-Eisenlohr and Dongxian Guo International transfer pricing and tax 
avoidance: Evidence from linked trade-tax statistics in the UK.  
 
WP17/14 Katarzyna Habu How much tax do companies pay in the UK? 
WP17/13 Katarzyna Habu How aggressive are foreign multinational companies in reducing 
their corporation tax liability? 
WP17/12 Edward D. Kleinbard  The right tax at the right time 
WP17/11 Aaron Flaaen The role of transfer prices in profit-shifting by U.S. multinational 
firms: Evidence from the 2004 Homeland Investment Act 
WP17/10 Ruud de Mooij and Li Liu At a cost: The real effect of transfer pricing regulations 
on multinational investments 
WP17/09 Wei Cui Taxation without information: The institutional foundations of modern tax 
collection 
WP17/08 John Brooks The definitions of income 
WP17/07 Michael P. Devereux and John Vella Implications of Digitalization for International 
Corporation Tax Reform 
WP17/06 Richard Collier and Michael P. Devereux The Destination–Based Cash Flow Tax and 
the Double Tax Treaties 
WP17/05 Li Liu Where does multinational investment go with Territorial Taxation 
 
WP17/04 Wiji Arulampalam, Michael P Devereux and Federica Liberini Taxes and Location 
of Targets 
 
WP17/03 Johannes Becker and Joachim Englisch A European Perspective on the US plans for 
a Destination based cash flow tax 
 
WP17/02 Andreas Haufler, Mohammed Mardan and Dirk Schindler Double tax 
discrimination to attract FDI and fight profit shifting: The role of CFC rules 
 
WP17/01 Alan Auerbach, Michael P. Devereux, Michael Keen and John Vella Destination-
based cash flow taxation 
 
WP16/14 Anzhela Cédelle The EU Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive: A UK Perspective 
 
WP16/13 Michael Devereux Measuring corporation tax uncertainty across countries: 
Evidence from a cross-country survey 
 
WP16/12 Andreas Haufler and Ulf Maier Regulatory competition in capital standards with 
selection effects among banks 
 
WP16/11 Katarzyna Habu Are financing constraints binding for investment? Evidence from 
natural experiment 
 
WP 16/10 Li Liu and Ben Lockwood VAT notches, voluntary registration and bunching: 
Theory and UK evidence 
 
WP 16/09 Harry Grubert and Roseanne Altshuler Shifting the burden of taxation from the 
corporate to the personal level and getting the corporate tax rate down to 15 percent 
 
WP 16/08 Margaret K McKeehan and George R Zodrow Balancing act: weighing the factors 
affecting the taxation of capital income in a small open economy 
 
WP 16/07 Michael P Devereux and Li Liu Stimulating investment through incorporation 
 
WP 16/06 Stephen R Bond and Irem Guceri R&D and productivity: Evidence from large UK 
establishments with substantial R&D activities 
 
WP16/05 Tobias Böhm, Nadine Riedel and Martin Simmler Large and influential: firm size 
and governments’ corporate tax rate choice? 
 
WP16/04 Dhammika Dharmapala The economics of corporate and business tax reform 
 
WP 16/03 Rita de la Feria EU VAT principles as interpretative aids to EU VAT rules: the 
inherent paradox 
 
WP 16/02 Irem Guceri Will the real R&D employees please stand up? Effects of tax breaks on 
firm level outcomes 
 
WP 16/01 Giorgia Maffini, Jing Xing and Michael P Devereux The impact of investment 
incentives: evidence from UK corporation tax returns 
 
WP 15/33  Anzhela Cédelle Enhanced co-operation: a way forward for tax harmonisation in 
the EU? 
 
WP 15/32 James Mahon and Eric Zwick Do experts help firms optimise? 
 
WP 15/31 Robin Boadway, Motohiro Sato and Jean-François Tremblay Cash-flow business 
taxation revisited: bankruptcy, risk aversion and asymmetric information 
 
WP 15/30 Martin Simmler Do multinational firms invest more? On the impact of internal 
debt financing and transfer pricing on capital accumulation 
 
WP 15/29 Daniel Shaviro The crossroads versus the seesaw: getting a 'fix' on recent 
international tax policy developments 
 
WP 15/28  Zhonglan Dai, Douglas A Shackelford, Yue (Layla) Ying and Harold H Zhang Do 
companies invest more after shareholder tax cuts? 
 
WP 15/27  Martin Ruf and Julia Schmider Who bears the cost of taxing the rich? An 
empirical study on CEO pay 
 
WP 15/26  Eric Orhn The corporate investment response to the domestic production 
activities deduction 
 
WP 15/25  Li Liu International taxation and MNE investment: evidence from the UK change 
to territoriality 
 
WP 15/24  Edward D Kleinbard Reimagining capital income taxation 
 
WP 15/23 James R Hines Jr, Niklas Potrafke, Marina Riem and Christoph Schinke Inter vivos 
transfers of ownership in family firms 
 
WP 15/22 Céline Azémar and Dhammika Dharmapala Tax sparing agreements, territorial tax 
reforms, and foreign direct investment 
 
WP 15/21 Wei Cui A critical review of proposals for destination-based cash-flow corporate 
taxation as an international tax reform option 
 
WP 15/20 Andrew Bird and Stephen A Karolyi Governance and taxes: evidence from 
regression discontinuity 
 
WP 15/19 Reuven Avi-Yonah Reinventing the wheel: what we can learn from the Tax Reform 
Act of 1986 
 
WP 15/18 Annette Alstadsæter, Salvador Barrios, Gaetan Nicodeme, Agnieszka Maria 
Skonieczna and Antonio Vezzani Patent boxes design, patents, location and local R&D 
 
WP 15/17 Laurent Bach Do better entrepreneurs avoid more taxes? 
 
WP 15/16 Nadja Dwenger, Frank M Fossen and Martin Simmler From financial to real 
economic crisis: evidence from individual firm–bank relationships in Germany 
 
WP 15/15 Giorgia Maffini and John Vella Evidence-based policy-making? The Commission's 
proposal for an FTT 
 
WP 15/14 Clemens Fuest and Jing Xing How can a country 'graduate' from procyclical fiscal 
policy? Evidence from China? 
 
WP 15/13 Richard Collier and Giorgia Maffini The UK international tax agenda for business 
and the impact of the OECD BEPS project 
 
WP 15/12 Irem Guceri and Li Liu Effectiveness of fiscal incentives for R&D: quasi-
experimental evidence 
 
WP 15/11 Irem Guceri Tax incentives and R&D: an evaluation of the 2002 UK reform using 
micro data 
 
WP 15/10 Rita de la Feria and Parintira Tanawong Surcharges and penalties in UK tax law 
 
WP 15/09 Ernesto Crivelli, Ruud de Mooij,  Michael Keen Base erosion, profit-shifting and 
developing countries  
 
WP 15/08 Judith Freedman Managing tax complexity: the institutional framework for tax 
policy-making and oversight  
 
WP 15/07 Michael P Devereux, Giorgia Maffini and Jing Xing Corporate tax incentives and 
capital structure: empirical evidence from UK tax returns  
 
WP 15/06 Li Liu and Ben Lockwood VAT notches 
 
WP 15/05 Clemens Fuest and Li Liu Does ownership affect the impact of taxes on firm 
behaviour? Evidence from China. 
 
WP 15/04 Michael P Devereux, Clemens Fuest and Ben Lockwood The taxation of foreign 
profits: a unified view 
 
WP 15/03 Jitao Tang and Rosanne Altshuler The spillover effects of outward foreign direct 
investment on home countries: evidence from the United States 
 
WP 15/02 Juan Carlos Suarez Serrato and Owen Zidar Who benefits from state corporate tax 
cuts? A local labour markets approach with heterogeneous firms 
 
WP 15/01 Ronald B Davies, Julien Martin, Mathieu Parenti and Farid Toubal Knocking on Tax 
Haven’s Door: multinational firms and transfer pricing 
 
